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Abstract
A large body of empirical literature indicates that, contrary to predictions from economic
theory, wages in the informal sector increase after a minimum wage hike. This phenomenon was
so far explained as a byproduct of a signal (a lighthouse) conveyed by statutory minima to wage
setting in the informal sector. A simple matching model shows that an increase in wages in the
informal sector may also be induced by signiﬁcant sorting and composition eﬀects between the
formal and the shadow sectors in the aftermath of the increase in the minimum wage. Using data
on Brazil, we ﬁnd that sorting accounts for at least one third of the increase in average wages
in the informal sector after a minimum wage hike. This contribution of endogenous sorting to
wage dynamics in the informal sector is also increasing over time.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic theory predicts that the introduction of a minimum wage in a dual economy (with a
signiﬁcant portion of the workforce employed in the informal sector) should depress wages in the
labor market segment in which the regulation is not enforced. However, much empirical literature,
notably on Latin American countries, indicates that wages actually increase in the informal sector
after a minimum wage hike. The literature explains this fact in terms of a signal given to wage
setting in the informal sector, a lighthouse eﬀect, inducing workers in the informal sector to ask
for higher wages. This explanation requires that workers in the informal sector retain substantial
bargaining power, more than oﬀsetting the negative supply shock.
In this paper we provide an alternative rationale for the positive eﬀect of minimum wages on
wages in the informal sector on the basis of the shadow sorting model provided by Boeri and
Garibaldi (2006), where workers and ﬁrms self-select themselves into a formal and an informal
sectors. The baseline equilibrium implies a separation of the two labor market segments by skills:
low-skilled workers operate in the informal sector and high skilled workers in the formal sector,
an implication which is well supported by the data on a variety of countries, including Brazil.
The model implies also that the introduction of the minimum wage induces a change in the skill
composition of the workforce in the two sectors, and in particular a shift of relatively skilled workers
into the informal sector as well as a shift of very low skilled workers into the formal sector. These
composition eﬀects induce an increase in the average productivity and wage in the informal sector.
Beyond these labor supply eﬀects, the introduction of the minimum wage has also a standard wage
cost eﬀect that tends to reduce employment and wages in the formal sector. These results also hold
in general equilibrium, but they depend on structural parameters of the model.
We test our alternative explanation by drawing on data from Brazil, allowing to track workers
and wages across the shadow margins. We ﬁnd support for both, the substantive assumptions of the
model (the fact that unskilled workers are concentrated in the informal sector) and its implications
(the fact that a minimum wage hike increases ﬂows of the least skilled from the informal to the
informal sector reducing employment in the latter). We also decompose the total variation in the
average wage of the informal sector between the period immediately before and after the change
in the minimum wage ﬁnding that the ”sorting” eﬀect may account for at least one third of the
increase in average wages in the informal sector after a minimum wage hike. Moreover, we ﬁnd
2that this contribution of sorting to wage adjustment is increasing over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the lighthouse eﬀect, presents
the Brazilian data and provides some evidence on the eﬀects of minimum wage hikes on wages
in the informal sector. Section 3 presents the baseline shadow sorting model and extends it to
accommodate a minimum wage. It then analyses the mechanics behind the lighthouse eﬀect,
obtaining a set of propositions that can be taken to the data. Section 4 goes back to the data and
evaluates these empirical implications. Finally, Section 5 brieﬂy summarizes and concludes.
2 The ”Lighthouse Eﬀect”
2.1 Literature review
A standard case considered by economic theory in which a minimum wage does not have a negative
eﬀect on employment is a dual labor market where the minimum wage is not enforced in a secondary
or informal labor market. As pointed out by Welch (1976), Gramlich (1976) and Mincer (1976),
following a minimum wage hike, workers displaced in the formal sector move to the uncovered sector.
Hence, as depicted in Figure 1, wages in the informal sector fall (from 
 to 
1) and labor supply in
the formal sector declines (shifting the  curve to the left). The minimum wage then reallocates
jobs from the formal to the informal sector, increasing the diﬀerence between formal and informal
sectors wages. This adjustment mechanism prevents fully employment losses only if there is perfect
labor mobility between the two sectors and wages are ﬂexible in the informal sector. Insofar as
workers losing their job have no access or limited access to unemployment beneﬁts (Gindling and
Terrell, 2004; Maloney and Nunez, 2003), this assumption seems to be acceptable in a relatively
large number of developing countries.
Contrary to this theoretical prediction, studies on developing countries (Lemos, 2004, and Fa-
jnzylber, 2001, for Brazil; Gindling and Terrell 2004b for Costa Rica; Jones, 1997, for Ghana),
where the informal sector is particularly large, quite surprisingly observed instead an increase in
wages also in the informal sector after a minimum wage hike. Nothwistanding measurement prob-
lems, this eﬀect seems rather robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the wage equation in the two
sectors (Amadeo, Gill, and Neri, 2000, Maloney and Nunez, 2003; Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo,
2000), notably in Brazil where data on the informal sector are considered to be more reliable.
T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c eo fp o s i t i v ee ﬀects of minimum wage rises on informal sector wages also
3Figure 1: The standard theoretical prediction
in other Latin American countries. Maloney and Nunez (2003), in particular, found that in Mexico,
Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Honduras and Colombia ”the inﬂuence of the minimum wage
appears is more signiﬁcant in the informal sector than in the formal sector”. Gindling and Terrell
(2004), however, did not ﬁnd evidence of any lighthouse eﬀect in Costa Rica.
The interpretation provided by this literature for these spillover eﬀects of minimum wages on
wage setting in the shadow sector is that the minimum wage set in the formal sector is a sort of
reference price, a signal for bargaining, throughout the economy at large. If ﬁrms have monopson-
istic power also in the informal sector, and “fair remuneration” considerations are relevant, it is
possible that changes in the minimum wage in the formal (and covered) sector lead to correspond-
ing increases in the average wage of the informal sector. The term ”Efeito Farol”o r” lighthouse
eﬀect” (Souza and Baltar, 1980) has been used to denote this phenomenon.
In countries such as Brazil, the minimum wage provides a reference in the deﬁnition of many
public sector (including local administrations) wages and some cash transfers and it is also used as a
benchmark within collective bargaining in the private sector. It is indeed very common for workers
to have their wages deﬁned as multiples of the minimum wage (Amadeo et. al 2000; Camargo,1984,
Neri, 1997). However, it is doubtful that in presence of signiﬁcant ﬂows of workers from the formal
to the informal sector, this positive social reference eﬀect on wages could prevail over the negative
labor supply shock eﬀect, induced by the presence of a downward sloping labor demand.
Alternative interpretations of the positive eﬀect of minimum wage hikes on informal sector wages
call into play substitution eﬀects. Employers could react to a minimum wage hike, by substituting
formal workers with informal ones, and the stronger demand for informal workers could more than
4oﬀset the increase of labor supply in this sector, inducing a rise in informal sector wages (Fajnzylber
2001).
Other scholars challenged the idea that the informal sector oﬀe r sj o b so fl o w e rq u a l i t yt h a n
those available in the formal sector (Maloney, 1999). According to these theories, an increase in the
minimum wage could make the formal sector a more attractive destination for some informal sector
workers and actually induce a decrease in the supply of labor in the informal sector, generating an
increase in informal sector wages.
2.2 Deﬁnitions and data
Aw i d e l yu s e dd e ﬁnition of the informal sector is “all economic activities which contribute to
the oﬃcially calculated (or observed) gross national product, but escape detection in the oﬃcial
estimates of GDP” (Feige, 1989 and 1994; Lubell, 1991 and Schneider 1994). This deﬁnition
encompasses not only legal, but also illegal activities, such as trade in stolen goods, drug dealing,
gambling, smuggling, etc.. In this paper we conﬁne our attention to a subset of the shadow economy,
namely to legal activities. Our notion of informal or shadow employment is one of a lawful activity
were it reported to tax authorities and subject to work regulations.
We rely on data from the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), a longitudinal survey performed
by the Brazilian statistical agency (IBGE) since 1980. PME is a monthly employment survey of
households in 6 of the major Brazilian metropolitan regions, namely Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de
Janeiro, Minas Gerais, S˜ ao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. It is organized as a rotating panel,
interviewing each of the households for four consecutive months, not interviewing them for the
next eight months and then interviewing them again for four months before they are deﬁnitely
excluded from the sample.
Althought the increase of the informality in the Brazilian labor market dates back to the 1980s, it
is only in the 1990s that it became really signiﬁcant, independently of cyclical ﬂuctuations (Amadeo
et al., 1994).
According to the Brazilian legislation, all workers must have a signed work card; workers with-
out such a card are considered informal workers since they do not pay taxes and social security
contributions. Moreover, labour regulations in terms of holidays and leave periods are typically not
respected for these workers. In the PME there is a speciﬁc question asking the interviewee whether
she/he has the work card, so that it is possible to disentangle formal from informal sector workers
51. This distinction, however, does not apply to the civil servants. Hence, in our analysis we focus
only on private sector employees.
Table 1 below provides some descriptive statistics on formal vs informal sector employees in
the various years covered by our analysis. Informal sector workers in our sample represent roughly
one third of the employees. Other studies (Ulyseea (2006)) reach estimates as high as 40 per cent,
so that it is quite possible that our data undersample informal sector workers. Women and young
workers are overrepresented in the informal sector compared with the formal sector. Over time,
educational attainments are increasing in both sectors, probably as a result of the eﬀorts put by the
Brazilian Government to increase the educational attainments of the population. Consistently with
evidence on other countries, formal sector employees are, on average, more educated than informal
sector ones, a key prediction of the model by Boeri and Garibaldi (2005), which is extended below.
1Many authors also consider the self-employed as belonging to the informal sector. In our analysis we concentrate
on dependent employment.
6Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the two sectors
Total % Women Age Education Hourly wage
(years) (years) (Reais)
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
1995 208242 86038 36.6% 43.3% 33.2 30.0 7.5 6.0 3.3 2.8
(.48) (.49) (10.97) (12.84) (4.06) (3.81) (.88) (.89)
2000 198166 97216 39.9% 45.2% 33.8 31.9 8.6 7.4 3.8 3.3
(.49) (.50) (10.85) (12.77) (3.91) (3.91) (.81) (.85)
2.3 Minimum Wage Adjustments, Spikes and the Lighthouse Eﬀect in Brazil
The ﬁrst minimum wage was introduced in Brazil in 1940 and was established in each region by a
Wage Commission whose main concern was to provide subsistence remuneration to a single adult
worker for a normal working day. Since 1984 the minimum wage is set at the national level and is
adjusted periodically by the Minist´ erio do Trabalho e Emprego mainly to preserve its purchasing
power. There is also a norm, which is rarely enforced, prohibiting the use of minimum wage as an
indexation parameter for social transfers.
Our analysis covers the period 1995 to 2000 neglecting the years of hyperinﬂation.Over this
period the minimum wage was adjusted annually in May except for the year 2000, when the
adjustment occurred in April. In this 6-years period, the level of the real hourly minimum wage
experienced a large increase in May 1995 and then declined to increase again towards the end of
the decade to match its real value in 1995 (250 Reais at 2007 prices, Figure 2). The minimum
wage, however, declined relative to the average wage in the informal sector (Figure 3 ), as the latter
experienced stronger wage growth than the formal sector.
Figure 4 plots the Kernel density estimator for the distribution of (real) wages of formal sector
employees before and after (bold line) the May 1995 minimum wage hike, which increased its level
from 70 to 100 Reais, a 40% increase in real terms. Figure 5 provides the same distributions for
informal sector employees.
Both distributions shift to the right after the introduction of the minimum wage. Notice that the
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Minimum Wage Changes
Figure 2: Evolution of real (dotted line) and nominal (continuous) minimum wage. Brazil: 1995-
2000.
of wages for informal sector workers that displays a marked spike in correspondence to the old and
new levels of the minimum wage. Thus, our data suggest that wages in the informal sector increase
as a result of minimum wage hikes, just as pointed out by the literature on the lighthouse eﬀect.
These spikes are broadly in accordance with the lighthouse explanations, although there is also a
spike well above the new level of the minimum wage, which was not present before the regulatory
change.
The model in the next section provides a new sorting mechanism rationalizing these changes in
the wage distribution occurring above the minima.
3 A Shadow Sorting Model and the Minimum Wage
3.1 Shadow Employment and Worker’s Sorting
We consider an economy with a measure one of heterogenous workers and two sectors. The worker
type is indicated by ,w h e r e refers to labor market productivity and its value is drawn from a
continuous cumulative distribution function  with support [minmax].  is a ﬁxed time invariant
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Real Minimum Wage as Proportion of the Average Wages
Figure 3: Real minimum wage as proportion of the average wage
There are two sectors in the labor market: the regular sector and the shadow sector. In the
regular sector ﬁrms pay a production tax  in every period in which they employ a worker, so that
the net value of production of the worker is −. In the shadow sector, the tax is evaded and there is
an instantaneous monitoring rate equal to . Conditional on being monitored in the shadow sector,
the shadow job is destroyed. Both regular and shadow jobs are otherwise exogenously destroyed at
rate 2Let us denote, with subscripts ””a n d” ” legal and shadow jobs respectively.
Firms can freely post a vacancy in either sector. We focus on single jobs, and each ﬁrm is made
of one job. Posting a vacancy in the regular sector costs  per period while in the shadow sector
costs . There is free entry of ﬁrms in both sectors and the equilibrium value of a vacancy is driven
down to zero. This vacancy and job creation characterizes the labor demand side of the model.
The labor supply is governed by the workers’ sorting behavior. Workers are endowed with a
unit of time and freely decide whether it is optimal to search and work in the shadow sector or
in the legal sector. Entering a sector is a full-time activity, and workers cannot simultaneously
work and/or search in both sectors. In the legal sector there is a speciﬁc unemployed income
(unemployment beneﬁts) which is not available in the shadow sector.
Labor markets are imperfect, and there are market frictions in each sector. We follow the main
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Figure 4: Kernel density of hourly wages in the formal sector before (continuos line) and after
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Figure 5: Kernel density of hourly wages in the informal sector before (continuous line) and after
(dotted line) the minimum wage hike.
10matching literature (Pissarides, 2000), and assume that the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed
workers is regulated by a matching function with constant returns to scale. Diﬀerent matching
functions exist in diﬀerent sectors. The matching function in each sector is indicated with
()  = 
where  and  denote vacancies and unemployment respectively. As in the traditional matching
models with constant returns to scale, the transition rate depends on the relative number of traders,
as u ﬃcient statistics which is indicated by  = 











()w i t h0  0.
3.2 Wages and Minimum Wages
Successful matches in each sector enjoy a pure economic rent. We assume that in each sector wages
obtain a fraction  of the total surplus from the job () where the exact deﬁnition of the surplus
will be introduced shortly. We indicate with 
() the bargained wage in each sector. Yet, in
the legal sector, and only in the legal sector, a minimum wage min is fully enforced. This implies










In other words wages obtain a fraction  of the total surplus as long as such value is above the




We solve the model in three steps. First, we present the value functions and the asset equations
without the minimum wage. Second, we solve the workers’ sorting behaviour with a binding
minimum wage in partial equilibrium, taking as given job creation (the labor demand side of the
model) and the transition rate in each market. The eﬀects of the minimum wage on the workers’
sorting behaviour is discussed in some detail and the lighthouse result is obtained. Third, we discuss
the extension of the model when the job creation and the general equilibrium eﬀects are taken into
account. The purpose of this theoretical analysis is to derive a set of testable predictions on the
eﬀects on informal sector wages and employment of minimum wage hikes. For more details on the
model we refer to Boeri and Garibaldi (2006).
113.3 Value Functions with a non binding minimum wage
We ﬁrst assume that the minimum wage is not binding, so that it is irrelevant for our analysis.
The value of a ﬁlled job in the legal sector with productivity  reads
()= − 
() −  + [  − ()]
where  is the tax rate,   is the value of a vacancy and  is the pure discount rate. Jobs are
destroyed at the exogenous rate  and 
() is the bargained wage rate.
Unemployment is a full time activity, and workers cannot work in the shadow sector during an
unemployment spell. The value of unemployment in the legal sector for a worker of type  is
()= + ()[() − ()]
where  is the sector speciﬁc unemployed income (the unemployment beneﬁts), and ()i st h e
value of the job for a type . The value of a job in the legal sector is
()=
()+[() − ()]
Posting vacancies in the legal sector is costly, and yields a ﬂow return equal to −. Conditional
on meeting a worker, at rate (), the ﬁrm gets the expected value of a job. Thus, the value of a
vacant post reads
 = − + (
)[ [() |  ∈ Ω] −  ]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the productivity of workers that search in the legal
sector. The expression Ω refers to the support of workers who search in the legal sector.
The value functions for jobs in the shadow sector are similarly deﬁned. The main diﬀerences
are that in the shadow sector ﬁrms do not pay the production tax  and the job is monitored and
destroyed at rate . Further, there is no speciﬁc unemployed income . The four value functions,
in the informal sector, read
()= − +(  + )[  − ()]
()=
()+(  + )[() − ()]
()=(
)[() − ()]
  = − + (
)[ [() |  ∈ Ω] −  ]
where Ω is support of workers that search in the shadow sector.
12As anticipated in the previous section, wages in each sector are the outcome of a bilateral
matching process and workers get a fraction  of the total surplus, so that
[() − ()] = ()

()=() − ()+() −  ()
In words, the total surplus is the value of a match net of the outside income of employers and
workers.
3.4 Solving the worker’s sorting behavior
Using the value functions deﬁned above, and holding the value of a vacancy costant and equal to
zero (a condition that is actually satisﬁed in general equilibrium), the surplus of a match for a legal
job with productivity  is
( + )()= −  −  − ()[() − ()]
Recalling that wages get a fraction  of the total surplus, the previous expression reads
()=
 −  − 
 +  + ()
(1)
Similarly, the surplus in the shadow sector is
()=

 +  +  + ()
(2)
Note that in the surplus expressions the matching rates are constant with respect to the idiosyn-
craitc productivity , and the surplus from the job is an increasing linear function of the match
speciﬁc productivity  Using (1) and (2) it is possible to obtain the value of unemployment in the
two sectors as a function only of ﬂow values
()= +
() [ −  − ]
 +  + ()
()=
()
 +  +  + ()
Figure 6 shows the two value functions in partial equilibrium as a function of gross productivity
. The diﬀerences in the two curves are driven by the intercept (which is negative in the legal
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Figure 6: Workers’ sorting in partial equilibrium (with constant job ﬁnding rates).
A1. Taxation is large enough relative to unemployment beneﬁts. This implies that the intercept
of  is negative in Figure 6. We thus formally assume that ( + )  
A2. Monitoring is large enough to satisfy the condition 
(+)(−)
 .T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
the value function of  is steeper than .
From the value functions, we can get an expression for the reservation productivity. The
reservation value , if it exists, is the crossing point of the two lines. Existence in partial equilibrium
requires that 0, and the two key assumptions A1 and A2 above ensure that  is indeed positive.
The equilibrium that we are considering implies that shadow jobs are occupied by workers with
low skills, in line with the evidence discussed in Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and further provided in
Section 4 of this paper. The sorting of workers by productivity in the two sectors, is a key premise
of our theoretical analysis.3
Remark 1 When there is no minimum wage, shadow jobs are occupied by relatively low skilled
workers.
Finally, using again (1) and (2), note that the bargained wage in the two sectors is

()=
( −  − )( +  + ())
 +  + ()

()=
()( +  +  + ())
 +  +  + ()
3There are several comparative static results. An increase in unemployment beneﬁts reduces the reservation
productivity ,s ot h a t

  0; An increase in taxation increases shadow employment. Formally, it is obtained by
observing that

  0. An increase in the monitoring rate reduces shadow employment. Formally, this result is
obtained by noting that

  0
14Unsurprisingly, the wage is an increasing function of the match speciﬁc productivity, 
3.5 Workers’ sorting with a binding minimum wage
The presence of the minimum wage modiﬁes the workers’ sorting behaviour. The minimum wage
is, by deﬁnition, paid only in the formal sector. As a result, the worker’s value of unemployment
















The introduction of the minimum wage implies that the wage function and the associated value
function have a kink at ()=min as displayed in Figure 7. Since the minimum wage applies
only to formal sector jobs, we say that the minimum wage is binding if   .I nw h a tf o l l o w sw e
assume that this is indeed the case. When the minimum wage is binding, the two value functions
cross twice, and the partition of workers across the two sectors is governed by two reservation
values. In particular, deﬁne as , the reservation productivity such that workers are indiﬀerent








 +  +  + (
)
=  + (
)
min − 
 +  + (
)
The introduction of the minimum wage changes the allocation of workers across the two sectors
and two value functions cross twice, as displayed in Figure 8. Speciﬁcally, with the introduction of
the minimum wage workers allocate to the regular sector if   and  , where from now
onward we indicate the the lower threshold with subscript  and the upper threshold with subscript
 In light of this allocation, workers belong to the shadow sector if   ..T h e t w o
threshold  and  are the solutions to the following two equtions
()
 +  +  + ()
=  + ()
min − 
 +  + ()
(3)
()
 +  +  + ()
=  +
()( −  − )
 +  + ()
We are now in a position to derive three key implications of our analysis
15Proposition 1 The introduction of the minimum wage changes the skill composition of workers
in the shadow sector and in the regular sector. In particular, the average skill level of workers in
the shadow sector increases
Proposition 2 Lighthouse eﬀect. A marginal increase in the minimum wage increases the average
wage in the shadow sector
Proposition 1 is straightforward and can be easily seen with the help of Figure 8. The minimum
wage introduces an additional threshold in the allocation of workers across skills. Workers in the
regular sector are now not only the workers with individual productivity above  but also workers
with productivity below . Conversely, workers in the shadow sectors are those workers that
have productivity between the two reservation values. The latter observation leads immediately to
Proposition 2. The model presented implies a lighthouse eﬀect in the shadow sector. An increase
in the minimum wage increases the threshold  while it has no direct impact on the threshold .
The key result for the lighthouse eﬀect is obtained by the fact that 
min  0i ne q u a t i o n( 3 ) .T o
prove the results analytically let’s deﬁne the average wage in the shadow sector as the expected






Note that in partial equilibrium 
min = 0 so that the lighthouse eﬀect immediately follows. For-












that is certainly positive since the wage bargained is an increasing function of the idiosyncratic
productivity 
Proposition 3 An increase in the minimum wage increases the supply of low skill workers in the
regular sector
Proposition 3 is a corollary of the lighthouse eﬀect. Very low skill workers are now supplying
their skills in the regular sector. This clearly reduces the average skills of workers in the regular
sector. Note that all these results are obtained in partial equilibrium, at given labor demand. The
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Figure 9:
173.6 Labor Demand, Job Creation and General Equilibrium
Job creation in both sectors is obtained by solving for the average value of the job in both sectors.
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) show the analytics of the model in details and also how to obtain the
general equilibrium. In this paper we derive the key equilibrium conditions and discuss the results
with an illustrative simulation
In general equilibrium there are four key equilibrium conditions
• Free entry and job creation in the legal sector (), which implies that the value of a vacancy
be zero
  =0
This equation will determine market tightness in the legal sector 
• Free entry and job creation in the shadow sector (), which implies that the value of a
vacancy be zero
  =0
This equation will determine market tightness in the shadow sector 
• Workers’ sorting If the minimum wage is binding, the labor supply is described by two




The four conditions can be written as
(
)[() − ()] =  + (
)[() − ()] (Sort)
(
)[() − ()] =  + (
)
min − 
























18The ﬁrst two two conditions are the sorting equations obtained in partial equilibrium, but are
to be solved now also with endogenous labor demand. The third condition states that the total
search costs in the legal sector are identical to the expected value of a job. The last condition
has a similar interpretation, but refers to the shadow sector. The system determines the three
endogenous variables  and  and 
4.
The model is closed by determining the stock of workers into the four possible labor market
states: unemployment and employment in each of the two sectors. If we indicate with  the stock
of unemployed in each sector and with  the stock of employed, we have
 +  +  +  =1
Workers’ sorting in the baseline model implies that the share of workers in the shadow sector is
() − () while the workers in the legal sector are the two fractions ()a n d1− ()
workers search in the legal sector. Unemployment and employment in the shadow sector read
respectively
 =
( + )[() − ()]





 +  + (
)










We are now in a position to formally deﬁne the equilibrium of the model.
Deﬁnition 1 Baseline Equilibrium. The equilibrium is obtained by a n-tuple  ,  and  and
a vector of stock variables that satisfy the value functions  ( = ), and i) Workers’
sorting, ii) Job Creation in the legal sector, iii) Job Creation in the shadow sector, iv) balance ﬂow
conditions
4Note that the previous conditions assume that the minimum wage is binding and that the kink in the wage function


()=min takes place between the two reservation values  and . When solving the model numerically one
needs to take care that such condition is satisﬁed.
19Formally, the general equilibrium deﬁned above is a solution to the following system of 4 equa-
tions in 4 unknowns  
()
 +  +  + ()
=  + ()
min − 
 +  + ()
()
 +  +  + ()
=  +
()( −  − )











(1 − ()) +
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( +  +  + ())




3.7 An Illustrative simulation
Market tightness  and the associated job ﬁnding rates  that were held costant in partial
equilibrium analysis, depend on the various parameters, as well as on the workers’ sorting behavior.
Most parameters have a direct eﬀect on job creation, plus an indirect eﬀect via the reservation
productivities  and .
The model cannot be easily solved analytically but it can be simulated. Note that in general
equilibrium the labor demand eﬀects are likely to induce a reduction in the demad for jobs as the
minimum wage is increased. Yet, for the purpose of this paper, it is still possible that the partial
equilibrium eﬀects around the sorting conditions  hold (proposition 2 above), as the increase
in the minimum wage is likely to attract people into the legal sector, thus inducing a change in
the skill composition of people in the shadow sector. By looking at the ﬁrst equation, for given
market tightness  and  above suggests that this is indeed the case. Yet in general equilibrium
is certainly no longer true that 
min = 0 so that there is an additional eﬀect coming from the
change in the upper threshold. In addition, in general equilibrium an increase in the minimum
wage induces a likely reduction in the ﬁrms’ willingness to create jobs, since the increase in the
average wage comes along an increase in expected costs. All these eﬀects imply that the general
equilibrium eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage is not indeed obvious and depends also on
the distribution of jobs () around the thresholds.
The general equilibrium of the model is obtained by solving for the two reservation productiv-
ities and market tightness levels   . Table 2 presents an illustrative simulation for two
economies that are identical with respect to all the parameters with the only exception that the
20minimum wage increases from 0.1 to 0.12 in the second economy. The simulation shows that in the
aftermath of the increase in the minimum wage the average wage increases not only in the regular
sector, but also in the shadow sector. The mechanics of the result in the illustrative case depends
entirely on the increase in  since the upper threshold  is unaﬀected by the increase in the
minimum wage.
Table 1: Increase in minimum wage in general equilibrium
 =0 1  =0 12
Parameters Not Legal Shadow Legal Shadow
Discount Rate r 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Separation Rate  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Unemployed Income b 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Matching elasticity  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Monitoring Rate  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Production Tax  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Matching Function Costant  0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6
Worker’s surlus share  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
search costs c 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Equilibrium Values
Sorting 1  0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24
Sorting 2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Market Tightness  0.52 0.20 0.50 0.19
Aggregate Statistics
Unemployment  0.162 0.141 0.165 0.143
Employment n 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.29
Average Wage  0.138 0.067 0.145 0.075
() Distribution is Exponential with parameter  =2 0a n dΛ =2.0
Source: Authors’ calculation
The spirit of the simulation and the general equilibrium suggests that an increase in the mini-
mum wage may induce an increase in wages in the shadow sector, but in general depends on some
speciﬁc structural parameters of the model, and also on the distribution of productivity around the
threshold. In the next section we go back to the data and consider whether the implications of the
theroetical analysis are consistent with evidence on Brazil.
214B a c k t o t h e D a t a
We proceed in three steps in order to test the empirical relevance of our explanation for the eﬀects
of minimum wage hikes on informal sector wages. First, we obtain some empirical proxy for the
skill level of the workers in the two sectors. Our model has a key prediction in terms of allocation of
skills between the two sectors and the baseline model implies that the shadow sector has a lower skill
composition than the formal sector. Next, we analyse the correlation of these proxies (ﬁxed-eﬀects
in a wage equation) with observed data on educational attainments and we use ﬂows between the
informal sector and the formal sector at diﬀerent skill level to evaluate — within a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences approach — the empirical relevance of the predictions of our model. Finally we provide
an estimate of the fraction of the change in wages in the informal sector which can be accounted
for by sorting behaviour, as opposed to lighthouse eﬀects.
4.1 Fixed eﬀects estimates
Exploiting the longitudinal structure of data we estimated for each year in our sample the following
wage regression
log()= +  +  +  + 
where  are hourly wages  is an individual ﬁxed-eﬀect,  is a set of time (monthly) dummies,
 and  capture, years of education and tenure respectively, that is, individual time-varying
eﬀects, and  is the error term. This equation was estimated only on workers being employed for
at least two-periods covered by the longitudinal structure of our data described in Section 2, in
order to recover the individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The latter should oﬀer a measure of observable and
unobservable time-invariant diﬀerences in the skills of individuals.
Table 3 displays the correlation of these estimated ﬁxed eﬀects with the reported years of
schooling. As shown by the table, the correlation is always positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
This is fairly encouraging as we expect skills to be positively correlated to schooling
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Figure 10 displays the distribution of ﬁxed eﬀects for formal sector (dark histograms) and
informal sector workers in 19955. In essence, informal sector workers do have systematically lower
ﬁxed eﬀects than formal sector workers. This is in line with the substantive assumptions of our
model.
5Similar diagrams are available from the authors for the other years covered by data and provide the same
information.
234.2 Shifts across the shadow margins
Our model explains the increase in wages in the informal sector following a minimum wage hike as a
byproduct of sorting of workers across the shadow margins. Proposition (4) and (5) make this point
clear. An increase in the minimum wage induces shifts of low-skilled workers from the informal
to the formal sector. This eﬀect holds both in partial and in general equilibrium. Shifts in labor
demand may also originate shifts of relatively high skill workers from the informal sector to the
formal sector, partly oﬀsetting the eﬀects of sorting at the lower threshold on average productivity
and wages in the informal sector in the aftermath of an increase in the minimum wage Alternatively
labor demand may shift down the upper threshold inducing shifts of workers from the formal to
the informal sector. The model also predicts a decline in the size of the informal sector and an
increase in average educational attainments, after an increase in the minimum wage.
A test of the implications of our model is therefore in looking at transitions across the shadow
margins at diﬀerent skill.levels Table 4 performs a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis of these shifts.
In particular, before refers to the period January-February-March while after to the three months
after the changes in the minimum wage (May-June-July). We performed this analysis for all years
covered by our data, but we display here only those referred to 1995, the year in which there was
the strongest increase in the minimum wage (a 40 per cent increase in real terms).
In the ﬁrst panel on the left-hand-side we compare changes in outﬂow rates from informal to
formal jobs at the lowest end (ﬁrst decile) and in the middle (ﬁfth decile) of the distribution of ﬁxed
eﬀects in the shadow sector. According to the predictions of our model, shifts across the shadow
margins should take place either in the ﬁrst decile of the skill distribution (the partial equilibrium
eﬀect) or at the10th decile (the general equilibrium eﬀect). Thus diﬀerences in outﬂow rates from
informal to the formal sector at the ﬁfth decile control for factors (e.g., seasonal eﬀects), which
may have aﬀected all outﬂow rates, independently of sorting eﬀects. We ﬁnd that ﬂows from the
ﬁrst decile increase while those originating from the ﬁfth decile decline. In double diﬀerence terms,
we observe an increase in outﬂow rates of the least skilled of about 20 per cent (2.15 base points).
This is in line with the implications of our model.
A similar analysis is carried out for ﬂows from the formal to the informal sector. Here in general
equilibrium we should observe, according to our model, ﬂows only at the lowest end of the skill
distribution of formal sector workers. Consistently with this empirical prediction, we consider the
24tenth decile of the distribution of ﬁxed eﬀects in the formal sector as a control group. The overall,
double-diﬀerence eﬀect, is once again positive and sizeable (1.5 base points, that is, a 20% increase)
in line with the implications of our model.
The two lowest panels compare the evolutions of size and educational attainments in the two
sectors. We ﬁnd that employment in both sectors decreases after the minimum wage, but slightly
more so in the formal sector than in the informal sector. Notice that the standard theory predicts
that the informal sector should experience a positive supply shock, absorbing workers from the for-
mal sector. We instead ﬁnd that both sectors decline. The decline in the size of the shadow sector
is consistent with the sorting hypothesis. However, it should be stressed that the theoretical propo-
sitions refer to steady state comparisons while our empirical analysis is unavoidably concentrated
on the short-run, which may involve a temporary rise of unemployment.
Insofar as educational attainments are concerned, we ﬁnd that the average number of years of
schooling is increasing in both sectors. This is also consistent with the sorting hypothesis.
Table 4. Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences Analysis of the Sorting Hypothesis
IF Flows(%) FI Flows(%)
Before After ∆ Before After ∆
Low Skill (1st decile fe distribution) 10.84 11.06 0.22 Low Skill (1st decile fe distribution) 15.95 17.00 1.05
Medium Skill (5th decile fe distribution) 23.91 21.98 -1.93 HighSkill (10th decile fe distribution) 3.37 2.99 -0.38
∆∆ 2.15 ∆∆ 1.43
Size (number of full-time employees, 000s) Average Education (years)
Before After ∆(%) Before After ∆
Informal 10426 10255 -1.64 Informal 5.95 6.05 0.10
Formal 29195 28552 -2.20 Formal 7.35 7.52 0.17
∆∆ 0.56 ∆∆ -0.07
4.3 A simple Decomposition
Finally, Table 5 decomposes the total variation in wages in the informal sector between lighthouse
and sorting eﬀects. In particular, it disantangles the changes in the average wage of those workers
who have been continuously working in the informal sector before and after the minimum wage hike
25(the lighthouse component) from the residual sorting component, which is associated to persons
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= {lighthouse} + {sorting}
where ∆ denotes the variation in the average wage in the informal sector between the three
months preceding the change in the minimum wage (January, February and March) and the three
months after the minimum wage hike (June, July and August)6,w h i l e and  denote outﬂows
from and inﬂows into the informal sector employment () respectively and in the approximation
we impose the steady state condition
∆
 =  −  =0
In other words, we consider that the signal eﬀect is relevant for wage renegotiation for those
working continuously in the informal sector, while changes in the average wage between those
leaving the informal sector after the minimum wage hike and those entering subsequently capture
the compositional eﬀects related to the sorting of workers by skills.
The message delivered by Table 5 is that the sorting component explains at least one third of
the increase in the average wage in the informal sector. Signiﬁcantly this contribution is increasing
over time, while the lighthouse eﬀects in some years (e.g., 2000) is negative.
6In the year 2000 the change in the minumum wageoccurred in April. Thuswe considered the two periods
December-January-February, and May-June-July.
26Table 5. Sorting and lighthouse eﬀects: assessing the contributions
1995 1996
∆ ∆
Total variation 32.8 Total variation 21.7
contribution lighthouse 22.2 (68%) contribution lighthouse 13.7 (63%)
contribution sorting 10.6 (32%) contribution sorting 8.0 (37%)
1999 2000
∆ ∆
Total variation 6.4 Total variation 6.0
contribution lighthouse 3.9 (41%) contribution lighthouse -0.5 (-7%)
contribution sorting 2.5 (39%) contribution sorting 6.4 (107%)
5 Final Remarks
The literature on minimum wages in developing countries documented that, contrary to standard
predictions of economic theory, average wages in the informal sector tend to react positively to an
increase in the minimum wage in the formal sector. This eﬀect has been explained as a lighthouse
eﬀect, that is, a signal oﬀered by the minimum wage to wage setting in the informal sector, but
this explanation has never been tested empirically.
In this paper we provided an additional explanation for this puzzle which is based on sorting
of workers across the shadow margins. We also extended a general equilibrium model of the labor
market to characterise the type of sorting that it is expected to occur after a minimum wage hike.
Finally, we went back to the data to test the key implications of the model and measured the
importance played by sorting in wage variation in the informal sector after a minimum wage hike.
We found that the skill composition of outﬂows from the informal sector to the formal sector and
vice versa are broadly in line with the implications of the model. We also found evidence that
the shadow sector declines and educational attainments in both sectors increase after a minimum
wage hike. This evidence is consistent with the sorting hypothesis while it is not with the standard
theory reviewed in Section 2, predicting a positive labour supply shock in the informal sector.
27Finally we decomposed the total variation of average wages in the informal sector between the
lighthouse and the sorting components ﬁnding that the latter explains at least one third of the
total increase in average wages in the informal sector in the three months after the increase in the
minimum wage with respect to the conditions prevailing before the minimum wage hike.
Further work may look at the implications of sorting for other moments of the distribution of
wages in the informal sector and apply alternative decomposition techniques to evaluate the eﬀects
of minimum wage changes over the entire distribution of wages in the informal sector. It would
also be important to anayse more in detail wage setting in the informal sector possibly relying on
ad-hoc surveys eliciting wage and working conditions in this segment of the economy.
28References
[1] Amadeo, Edward J., Barros, R.P, Gonzaga, G., Mendon¸ ca, R. (1994) ”A natureza e o funcionamento
do mercado de trabalho brasileiro desde 1980”. IPEA, S´ erie Semin´ arios.
[2] Amadeo, Edward J., Gill, Indermit, S. Gill and Neri, M. (2000) Brazil: The Pressure Points In Labor
Legislation. Ensaios Economicos da EPGE n 395.
[3] Boeri, T. (2000) Structural Change, Welfare Systems and labor Reallocation,O x f o r d :O x f o r dU n i v e r s i t y
Press.
[4] Boeri, T. and Garibaldi, P. (2002) ”Shadow Employment and Unemployment in a Depressed Labor
market, CEPR Working Paper.
[5] Boeri, T. and Garibaldi, P. (2005) ”Shadow Sorting” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005,C .
Pissarides and J. Frenkel (eds.), MIT Press.
[6] Fajnzylber, P. (2001) ”Minimum Wage Eﬀects Throughout the Wage Distribution: Evidence from
Brazil’s Formal and Informal Sectors”, Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia n◦ 098.
[7] Feige, E.(1989) The Underground Economies. Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[8] Feige, E. (1994) ”The Underground Economies and Currency Enigma”. Supplement to Public Fi-
nance/Finances Publiques, 49:119-36.
[9] Gindling, T.H. and Terrell, K. (2004) ”The eﬀects of multiple minimum wages throughout the labor
market”. IZA Discussion Paper n. 1159.
[10] Gindling, T.H. and Terrell, K. (2004b) ”Legal Minimum Wages and the Wages of Formal and Informal
Sector Workers in Costa Rica”. IZA Discussion Paper n. 1018.
[11] Gonzaga, G. (2003), ”Labor turnover and labor legislation in Brazil”, Econom` ıa, 4(1):165-222.
[12] Gramlich, E. (1976) ”Impact of minimum wages on others wages, employment and family incomes”,
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2:409-451.
[13] Jones, P. (1997) ”The impact of the minimum wage legislation in the developing countries where
coverage is incomplete”, Institute of Economics and Statistics, WP/98-2.
29[14] Lemos, S. (2004) ”A Menu of Minimum Wage Variables for Evaluating Wages and Employment Eﬀects:
Evidence from Brazil”. IZA Discussion Paper n◦ 1069.
[15] Lubell, H. (1991) The informal Sector in the 1980s and 1990’s. Paris:OECD.
[16] Maloney, W. F. (1999) ”Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from
sectoral Transitions in Mexico”. The World Bank Economic Review, 13(2): 275-302
[17] Maloney, W. F. and Nunez, J. (2003) Minimum Wages in Latin America. The World Bank.
[18] Mincer, J. (1976) ”Unemployment eﬀects of minimum wages”. Journal of Political Economy, 84:87-104
[19] Neri, M.(1997) ”O Reajuste do Sal´ ario M´ ınimo de maio de 1995”. Anais da Sociedade Brasileira de
Econometria, Recife
[20] Neri, M., Gonzaga, G. and Camargo, J. M. (2000) ”Efeitos Informais do Sal´ ario M´ ınimo e Pobreza”.
Texto para discuss˜ ao n 724, IPEA
[21] Pissarides, C. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory,M I TP r e s s .
[22] Schneider (1994) “Measuring the Size and Development of the Shadow Economy: Can the Causes be
Found and the Obstacles be Overcome?” in Hermann Brandstaetter and Werner Guth, eds. Essay on
Economic Psychology Berlin: Springer: 193-212
[23] Souza, P. and Baltar P. (1980) ”Salario Minimo E Taxa De Salarios No Brasil — Replica”, Pesquisa e
Planejamento Economico, 10:1045-1058.
[24] Welch, F. (1976) ”Minimum wage legislation in the United States”, in Evaluating the labor market
eﬀects of of social programs, O. Ashenfelter and J. Blum (eds.), Princeton University Press.
[25] Yashiv, E. (2000) ”The Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment”, American Economic Review,
90(5):1297-1322.
30